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The Material Basis of Jurisprudencet
RICHARD A. POSNER'
This paper juxtaposes, I hope in a mutually illuminating rather than merely
paradoxical manner, two bodies of theory not often discussed in the same
breath: cartel theory, and jurisprudence. My aim is, with the aid of economics,
to cast new light on fundamental issues concerning the legal profession and
professional ideology.
I. THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF
Human beings are bright but selfish animals. Selfishness is as characteristic
of lawyers as it is of other people, although lawyers are brighter on average
than the population as a whole. So we should not be surprised that the history
of the legal profession is to a great extent, and despite noisy and incessant
protestation and apologetics, the history of efforts by all branches of the legal
profession, including the professoriate and the judiciary, to secure a lustrous
place in the financial and social status sun. And until sometime in the 1960's,
the legal profession in the United States, as in most other wealthy countries,
was succeeding triumphantly in this endeavor. The profession was an
intricately and ingeniously reticulated, though imperfect, cartel. Governmental
regulations designed to secure the cartel against competition and new entry
from without, and centrifugal, disintegrative competitive pressures from
within, held the cartel together against the dangers that beset and ordinarily
would destroy a cartel of many members. The organization of the profession
as a cartel produced, as a by-product, a certain view of "law"-the view of
law as an objective, existent, enigmatic, but ultimately knowable entity
constraining the behavior of lawyers and judges and thereby justifying the
autonomy of the profession from political or market controls.
The cartel has weakened since the 1960's. There is a fruitful analogy to the
decline of medieval craft production-also organized in cartels-and the rise
of modern mass production industry. The effects of the weakening of the legal
profession's cartel have been manifold. They include changes in the size and
organization of law firms, changes in the relative compensation of junior and
senior lawyers, an increase in the hours of work of lawyers, and a diminution
in the satisfactions that practitioners, judges, and law professors derive from
their jobs. And because mainstream legal thought is to a significant degree a
f © Copyright 1993 by Richard A. Posner. All rights reserved.
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by-product of cartelization, the weakening of the cartel has altered that
thought-has altered it in the direction of disintegration and of a search, so
far unavailing, for methods of reintegration. This body of thought is the
particular concern and preserve of academic law, so it should also come as no
surprise that the decline of the legal profession's cartel has thrown academic
law into a tailspin. Should the cartel collapse entirely and law become largely
an unregulated service like business management or retail selling, we can
expect a profound change in the reigning conception of law: a change from
the idea of law as an autonomous realm of thought to the idea of law as a
heterogeneous medley of rhetorical thrusts and parries, of advice and
mediation by wise elders, of policy analyses and investigations, of miscella-
neous clerical and bureaucratic tasks.
Economists consider cartels in general a bad thing, because they restrict
output below efficient levels and cause other distortions. But cartels can have
good effects as well, and the legal cartel has some good effects. I suspect
though cannot prove that the net effect is bad, and that such good effects as
there are could be secured with regulations less restrictive than those that
continue in force even in the cartel's present weakened form. Of one thing,
however, I am confident: that among the good effects of eliminating the legal
cartel would be to demolish "jurisprudence" in the special sense of the legal
profession's flattering self-conception of what it means to do, to be, to live
in, "the law."
Thirty years ago jurisprudence was "realistic" (in the scientific, not the
"legal realist" sense). The legal profession was thought to possess and deploy
cogent tools of inquiry-primarily deduction, analogy, precedent, interpreta-
tion, rule application, the identification and balancing of competing social
policies, the formulation and application of neutral principles, and judicial
restraint-constituting a methodology that could generate right answers to
even the most difficult legal questions. Law was believed to be objective,
impersonal, autonomous, constraining rather than manipulable, logical rather
than rhetorical, and-ideally, but it was thought an attainable ideal-nonpo-
litical. The Supreme Court was said by the highest of academic authorities to
be "predestined ... to be a voice of reason," for "reason is the life of the
law."' Today, in contrast, it is fast becoming a commonplace, though one
stubbornly resisted in some quarters, that the idea of the law's "objectivity"
and all that the term connotes have been exploded, that "we are all pragma-
tists now."2 Is this because what I am calling a realistic (not to be confused
1. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices,
73 HARv. L. REV. 84, 99, 125 (1959). Holmes, of course, had thought the "life of the law" was
"experience." OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). The shift in terms is portentous,
as we shall see.
2. This is the theme, not the words, of Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry
of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1811 (1990). He argues that Ronald Dworkin, Roberto Unger, and
myself, though occupying very different points on the jurisprudential compass, are all pragma-
tists-though it is a label that Dworkin resists fiercely. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 161
(1986). The symposium in which Rorty's piece appeared contains a number of other papers on the
pragmatic tendency in contemporary jurisprudence. Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in
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with legal realist) jurisprudence is false? Or, as I shall argue, because, true
or false (and it is sometimes one and sometimes the other), it is inappropriate
to the emerging structure of the legal profession, being the ideology of a
cartelized, not of a competitive, industry?
I argue that a professional ideology is the result not of a scientific-like
search for truth but of the way in which the members of the profession work,
the form and content of their careers, the activities that constitute their daily
rounds, in short the economic and social structure of the profession. The
argument draws on an interesting, though fragmentary and inconclusive,
literature on the effect of work on consciousness3 and on the history of the
medieval craft guilds, a history rich in illuminating parallels to that of the
American legal profession.
Do not, merely because Marxism is a discredited political philosophy,
dismiss out of hand the suggestion that a profession's characteristic modes of
thought might have economic causes. Medicine is rich with examples.' Why
has preventive medicine always been such an orphan of the medical
profession? Because some of the most effective methods of preventive
medicine, such as simple hygiene and water purification, do not require or
depend on medical training and their benefits to health are not easily
appropriated in the form of fees. Why did medieval physicians place such
emphasis on prognosis? Because, given the lack of much real knowledge of
disease, the essential skill from the standpoint of professional success was the
ability to determine whether a prospective patient was likely to recover; if not,
the case would be declined to protect the profession's reputation. And why
did those same physicians consider surgery not to be the practice of medicine
and leave it to barbers? Because the surgical skills of the time were almost
entirely mechanical, having no tincture of abstract knowledge and hence
inconsistent with the medical profession's self-presentation as a learned
profession. Should we be surprised to find that self-interest has played as big
a role in legal thought as in medical thought?
II. REALISM AND MATERIALISM
Even the most committed scientific realist would admit that the rate and
direction of scientific research are influenced by factors of a political,
ideological, or self-interested character extraneous to the truth of scientific
ideas.' But almost everyone, including the committed pragmatist, would also
American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990).
3. A literature well illustrated by JOSEPH BENSMAN & ROBERT L1LIENFELD, CRAFT AND
CONSCIOUSNESS: OCCUPATIONAL TECHNIQUE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD IMAGES (1973). See
also Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Reason and Rationality, in THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 285 (Karen S.
Cook & Margaret Levi eds., 1990), and Andrew Abbott's comment thereon, in id. at 317; ROBERT
BLAUNER, ALIENATION AND FREEDOM (1964).
4. The following examples are drawn from ERwIN H. ACKERKNECHT, A SHORT HISTORY OF
MEDICME 54, 82, 195 (1955).
5. This point is emphasized in recent sociological studies of scientific knowledge. For a review
of those studies, see H.M. Collins, The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Studies of Contemporary
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grant that the experimental, statistical, predictive, and observational proce-
dures of modem science, together with the technical capability of embodying
and thereby testing scientific theories in technology (such as atomic theory,
embodied in nuclear weapons and reactors), enable many scientific ideas to
be reasonably held with a degree of confidence (never one hundred percent
of course) that enables them to be called "true" without a sense of strain,
rather than merely convenient to believe. Scientific activity is a cultural,
therefore a local, activity. But the truths of science are not local; and the
language of science, mathematics, is a universal language.
It is otherwise in law, though this is not because of every respect in which
law and science differ. The problem is not, for example, that the law is
different in different places. A proposition about the law of X might be as
demonstrable in Y as in X, even though the law of Y on the point was
different. Nor is the problem that lawyers and judges make little use of
scientific methods. Many propositions that we hold as unshakably as we hold
core scientific propositions are not scientific-for example, that it is wrong
(in our culture, at this time) to torture children. That is as true a statement
about contemporary American morality as the statement-itself merely an
approximation, and impossible to verify by means comprehensible to the
ordinary person-that the earth revolves around the sun is a true proposition
of contemporary astronomy. And it is a statement that the inhabitants of a
culture that had no concept of child abuse could be brought to agree with, for
it is merely a descriptive statement about contemporary American morality,
and not a normative statement. The problem with law (and for that matter
with ethics as well) is that it lacks cogent techniques for resolving disagree-
ment. If everyone just happens to agree that laws which forbid abortion
infringe constitutional liberty, this becomes for all intents and purposes a true
proposition of contemporary American law. But if rational persons disagree
(and disagreement with this proposition cannot itself be deemed a sign of
irrationality, as might disagreement with the proposition that it is considered
wrong in our society to torture children, or that the earth revolves around the
sun), there is no method of resolving their disagreement other than by force
or some equivalently nonanalytic method of dispute resolution, such as voting.
There are no tests, procedures, protocols, or algorithms for determining which
side in the dispute is right. This is even truer of propositions ofjurisprudence
(rather than of law in the concrete), such as that the only real law is positive
law, or natural law, or that law should be utilitarian or economic in character
or should seek to promote equality above all, or that law is objective and
impersonal, or alternatively that it is subjective and political. Not that one
cannot make rational arguments pro and con the various position; but the
arguments convince only people who are predisposed because of temperament
or experiences to accept them. Especially with regard to the propositions of
jurisprudence, then, we should expect political, self-interested, traditional,
Science, 9 ANN. REv. Soc. 265 (1983). I reject the extreme position (the so-called "strong programme"
in the sociology of science) that the acceptance of scientific beliefs is unrelated to their truth.
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habitual, or other truth-independent considerations to play a far more
important role in explaining the content, character, and acceptance of ideas
than in the case of science. With deliberate provocation, I call factors in the
shaping of ideas that cannot be referred to a research program guided by the
search for truth "material" and locate the material basis of jurisprudence in
the rise and decline of cartelization in the legal profession.
I am not arguing that law is always and everywhere more political and
subjective than science-and that a realistic (again, in the scientific, not the
legal realist, sense) jurisprudence is therefore never an attainable goal. Law
today in England, where the profession remains cohesive and most political
questions have been removed from judicial consideration, is a more objective
discipline than chemistry was in the Middle Ages. In fact, law was more
objective thirty years ago in this country than it is today, which is why a
realistic jurisprudence was orthodox then and is becoming heterodox now.
Law is not all will and politics; it has tools of genuine intellectual inquiry and
analysis. But how well they work depends in major part on who is wielding
them and in what specific tasks.
III. PROFESSIONALISM
Since I place such emphasis on the structure of the legal profession as a
causal factor behind the ideas of jurisprudence, I dare not take for granted
what a "profession" is. It is an occupation in which competent performance
requires or is thought to require not merely know-how, experience, and
general "smarts," but also mastery of a body of specialized but relatively
(sometimes highly) abstract knowledge, such as some branch of science, or
some other body of thought believed to have structure and system, such as
theology, or "the law," or "military science," which is the study of the general
laws (in the scientific sense of the word) of tactics and strategy. With the
growth of universities-institutions that specialize in imparting as well as
enlarging abstract knowledge-the training for the professions has increasing-
ly assumed (especially in the United States) the form of postgraduate study,
though the older system of professional training-apprenticeship-remains
influential in such professions as journalism and the military, and for that
matter in medicine. So economics is a profession but business is not, because
you can be a successful businessman without having mastered a body of
formal knowledge, but you cannot be a successful economist on that basis.
Carpentry is not a profession either, because although it involves more
specialized training than business does, it does not require a high degree of
intellectual training or competence.6
6. The vast literature, mainly sociological, on the professions is well represented by ANDREw
ABoTT, THE SYSTEM OF PRoFEsSIoNs: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988), and
by ELIOT FREDsoN, PROFEsSIONAL PowERs: A STUDY OF THE INSTLTITIONALIZATION OF FORMAL
KNOWLEDGE (1986).
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I am interested in restricted professions, of which law and medicine are the
best known and most important. Economics is not restricted. Anyone can be
a self-described economist, can be hired as an economist, can (if able) do the
work of an economist. But one cannot practice law or medicine, or call
oneself a physician or a lawyer, or for that matter teach in a public school,
without a license. Many occupations that are not professions are also
restricted, such as barbering or driving a taxi. But precisely because they are
not professions, that is, they are not understood to require the mastery of a
body of formal knowledge, the restrictions take a different form. The most
characteristic though not only professional restriction today is a requirement
of protracted formal education including some, and sometimes a lot of,
specialized university-type education, plus proof of intellectual competence
demonstrated by passing a demanding written examination. It was not always
thus. Until this century, the formal educational prerequisites for lawyers in
this country and England were modest, and often nil. But law was always
understood to be a "learned" activity in both senses of the word and hence a
profession, and entry into it was almost always restricted in one way or
another.
Professional restrictions can be public (that is, governmental) or private, but
the latter will rarely be effective for long unless they have some backing from
government. Accreditation, for example, may be private, but unless the
licensing authorities, which are public, refuse to license the graduates of
unaccredited schools, accreditation may not do much to limit entry into the
profession. California, interestingly, is one of a tiny handful of states that still
allows persons who have not graduated from an accredited law school to be
admitted to the bar of the state if they pass the state bar exam; one conse-
quence is that unaccredited law schools have a significant foothold in
California. On the other hand, the California bar exam is uncommonly
difficult, so the superior training available at the accredited schools is of real
value to the student and enables such schools to charge higher tuition than
unaccredited schools do (and few try to pass the bar exam without having
attended any law school). Still, in California, the brunt of limiting entry is
shifted from the accrediting authorities and the law schools to the bar
examiners.
A. The Medieval Cartel as a Model of the Modern Legal Profession
The legal profession in its traditional form is a cartel of providers of
services related to society's laws.7 The theory of cartels explores the
circumstances under which firms are, and are not, able to increase their prices
7. The cartel explanation for professional restrictions is of course not new. See ABBOTT, supra note
6, at 63-64; MILTON FRIEDMAN4, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, ch. 9 (1962); D.S. LEES, ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROFESSIONS (1966); REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS: A PUBLIC-POLICY
SYMPOSIUM (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin eds., 1980) [hereinafter REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS];
S. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA (1987).
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above competitive levels and make the higher prices stick, at least for a
time.' Cartels come in a great variety of forms, today ranging from furtive
short-lived bid-rigging conspiracies in the highway construction industry to
the OPEC oil cartel, and including regulatory cartels such as that of the dairy
or the tobacco farmers. Few of these cartels, however, have a mystique or an
ideology, as restricted professions in general and the legal profession in
particular have; for that we must go to the medieval craft guilds, early cartels
that in periods both of prosperity and of decline resemble the corresponding
phases of the legal profession. As my interest in the medieval guild is limited
to the light it sheds on one of its remote descendants, it will be convenient to
bring out the salient features of the guild system through a composite portrait
of a fictitious guild.'
The linen weavers' guild of thie Duchy of Guermantes in twelfth-century
France operates under a charter from the Duke of Guermantes. The charter not
only authorizes the guild to manufacture and sell linen fabrics, but, as
important, it forbids the manufacture or importation into the duchy of linen
fabrics other than those made by guild members and imprinted with the
guild's exclusive mark. The prohibition of competitive entry is necessary
(unless the members of the guild have such low costs that the price set by the
guild, while in excess of those costs, is below the costs of new entrants)
because a market price that exceeds the costs of production and sale is a
magnet to firms in other markets and to people wanting to start their own
firms in this one.
The Guermantes weavers' guild obtained its monopoly charter by agreeing
to give the duke an annual present of its best fabrics. In exchange the guild
is able, by virtue of the prohibition that the duke imposed against competitive
entry, to fix prices that assure a handsome remuneration to the members of
the guild for their work even after the cost of their gift to the duke is
subtracted. But guild and duke alike are reluctant to justify the monopoly
charter in the stark terms of mutual economic self-interest. Even in a
nondemocratic polity, public opinion counts for something, and usually a lot.
Privilege is resented, and may also have ominous political implications. In a
later period, we find that the monopolist in the famous Case of Monopo-
lies'--in which the English judges sided with Parliament in its opposition
8. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 283, 285-94 (4th ed. 1992)
(summarizing the theory); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Cartel Policing Under Uncertainty:
The U.S. Steel Industry, 1933-1939, 32 J.L. & ECON. S47 (1989) (a recent case study).
9. For sources of this composite portrait, see ANTONY BLACK, GUILDS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN EU-
ROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM THE TWELFTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT (1984); Luio BRENTANO,
ON THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF GILDS, AND THE ORIGIN OF TRADE-UNIONS (1870); STEVEN
A. EPSTEIN, WAGE LABOR AND GUILDS IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1991); TOULMIN SMITH, ENGLISH
GILDS: THE ORIGINAL ORDINANCES OF MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED EARLY ENGLISH GILDS (1870);
EDGCUMBE STALEY, THE GUILDS OF FLORENCE (1906); SYLVIA L. THRUPP, The Gilds, in 3 CAMBRIDGE
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 230 (M.M. Postan et al. eds., 1965). For a particularly good discussion,
see HENRI PIRENNE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE 178-91 (1937). The
literature is summarized and criticized in Charles R. Hickson & Earl A. Thompson, A New Theory of
Guilds and European Economic Development, 28 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 127 (1991).
10. Darcy v. Allein, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602).
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to the Crown's practice of raising revenue without parliamentary consent by
selling monopolies-defended his monopoly of playing cards by arguing that
monopoly kept the quality up and also that permitting cheap foreign imports
would take jobs away from Englishmen.
We are therefore not surprised that the charter of the weavers' guild recites
that monopoly is necessary to protect the public from deceptively
cheap-because shoddy, but difficult to recognize as such-merchandise sold
by foreigners and other undependable people. A precocious guild theoretician
has pointed out that if consumers lack good information about the quality of
a product they will perforce assume that every brand of the product,
regardless of its price, is of average quality. They will therefore buy the
cheapest brand-which, being of lowest quality, will probably cost the least
to make. Producers of the higher-quality, costlier brands, unable to recoup
their additional costs by charging a higher price, will be driven from the
market unless they reduce the quality and hence the cost of their brand. With
unrestricted competition, therefore, quality will spiral downward, and
consumers will end up receiving a lower quality of product than they want
and would be willing to pay for."
The quality-protection rationale (or rationalization) for prohibiting entry has
a further utility to the guild. Although prohibiting entry is necessary if the
guild is to have supracompetitive profits, it is not sufficient. If the members
of a guild are numerous (and perhaps even if they are few), each will have an
incentive to expand his output until the cost of the last unit that he produces
is equal to the market price; because until that point is reached a greater
output will increase his profits. The eventual result of all the additional output
of these profit-maximizing guild members will be, however, to drive the
market price down to the competitive level. One might suppose that this
unhappy result could easily be averted by the guild's fixing a minimum price
for its members' output at the level that maximizes their profits as a whole,
and by punishing cheaters, that is, price cutters. The weavers' guild has done
this. But even though outright cheating by members-the slight shading of the
fixed minimum price to enable the member to sell a much larger output at a
profit per unit only slightly lower than he would obtain at the fixed price-has
been prevented, the temptation to engross a larger share of the guild's profits
led some members of the guild in its early days to work longer hours, or hire
more workers, in order to sell more at the fixed price. And it led others to
11. Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards,
87 J. POL. ECON. 1328 (1979). For criticism, see Keith B. Leffler, Commentary, in OCCUPATIONAL
LicENsuPE AND REGULATION 287 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980). In the case of a producer of personal
services, such as a lawyer, this can mean that the client gets a less skilled practitioner than he wants and
would be willing to pay for. See Carl Shapiro, Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing,
53 REv. ECON. STUD. 843 (1986). The economic case for regarding guilds as a response to a problem
of consumer uncertainty about quality is argued in Bo Gustafsson, The Rise and Economic Behavior of
Medieval Craft Guilds: An Economic-Theoretical Interpretation, 35 SCANDINAViAN ECON. HIST. REV.
1, 22 (1987). I make no attempt to evaluate the overall economic efficiency or social value of the guild
system or of the counterpart restrictions in the legal profession.
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increase the quality of their output in order to wrest business from their
competitors by offering the consumer more for the same (guild-fixed) price.
The guild has acted more vigorously against the first practice (increasing
quantity) than against the second (increasing quality). This is partly for
reasons of practicality and partly for reasons of public relations, or mystique.
It is relatively easy for a guild to fix and even to enforce limits on hours of
work and on number of workers. The weavers' guild has therefore forbidden
its members to work at night or on holidays, or to hire workers beyond the
minimum number of apprentices necessary to assure the continuation of the
guild after its present members die or retire. Although the guild's profits have,
nevertheless, eroded some, because its members persist in competing in
quality, this is not entirely a bad thing from the guild's standpoint. Quality
competition has reinforced the quality-protection argument that is the
cornerstone of the guild's claim of legitimacy. The guild really is producing
a superior product. In fact, it is a better product than consumers want, in the
sense that they would prefer a product of slightly lower quality at a lower
price. But they do not know the optimal price-quality combination because
they are offered no alternative. What they do know and what the guild does
not let them forget is that they are getting a satisfyingly high-quality product
along such dimensions as tightness of weave, strength, softness, appearance,
and durability.
The restrictions on employment, although primarily intended to limit the
quantity produced by the weavers' guild, also reinforce the quality argument
for the guild's monopoly. Because a member of the guild cannot hire a flock
of workers-cannot operate on the factory system-he is, perforce, a
craftsman, a handicrafter. The weavers' guild has therefore vigorously
propagated a norm of craftsmanship, of hand-made-ness, as an index of
quality. It is a plausible norm in an era before department stores and
enforceable warranties. Each swatch of linen fabric produced by the guild
bears the mark not only of the guild but also of the member who produced it.
The consumer knows infallibly who the producer is. There is no divided
responsibility, no possibility of mutual finger-pointing, when any of the
guild's output proves defective.
The real danger to the guild is not that the members will compete away all
available profits by increasing the quality of their product, although they are
competing away some of the profits in this way. The danger is that the
members will try to increase their profits by reducing that quality and, with
it, their costs. Such competition would destroy the quality rationale for the
guild's monopoly, engender consumer dissatisfaction in the long run (in the
short run, consumers may not notice the deterioration in quality), and threaten
the survival of the guild and therefore of its higher-cost members by creating
irresistible pressure to abandon the minimum price fixed by the guild. The
weavers' guild of Guermantes has responded by fixing minimum standards of
quality of workmanship and materials. Members are required to adhere to
these standards under threat of expulsion from the guild if they do not. The
guild has gone so far as to specify the tools that the weavers must use. These
1993]
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standards, these requirements, have provided, in turn, additional support for
the quality rationale for guild restrictions-the guild is policing the quality of
its members' work directly rather than merely excluding putatively lower-
quality competitors.
The guild cannot expect the threat of sanctions to prevent all violations of
guild restrictions. It has sought therefore to encourage social cohesiveness
among its members in order to bring altruism and informal sanctions to bear
in support of compliance with the guild's restrictions. The guild has excluded
from membership Jews and other aliens believed not to share a common core
of basic tastes and values with the existing members of the guild. And it has
become a social as well as a business alliance, with frequent intermarriage
among the families of members and with generational competition muted by
drawing apprentices exclusively from the ranks of the sons and nephews of
the guild's present members. The guild does all it can to emphasize the
importance of pride in one's calling, of leading a blameless life, of loyalty to
the guild, and of equality among guild members-does all it can in short to
imbue its members with the moral precepts and values, communal rather than
individualistic, that reduce the likelihood that members will cheat on the price
and other restrictions that the guild imposes on them. Tradition not innova-
tion, uniformity not variety, emphasis on input rather than emphasis on output,
hence emphasis on quality rather than on quantity, and on doing one's own
work rather than contracting it out or delegating it to employees-in short on
making, on crafting, rather than on supervising the work of others-all are
attitudes and values that the guild has been sedulous to cultivate.
We must take a closer look at apprenticeship. Its significance lies not only
in its training function, 2 but also in the fact that a guild must make
provisions for its continuation into the indefinite future. Even if the guild's
members have no concern about its flourishing after they are dead, the guild
cannot hope to retain its privileged status under the laws of the Duchy of
Guermantes if it does not hold out reasonable assurances of being able to
supply the duchy's linen needs for the indefinite future. It must therefore
assure that there will be a next generation of guild members. How can it do
this without sharing its monopoly rents with a class of new entrants?
Apprenticeship is the answer. Entry into the potentially lucrative occupation
of being a member of the weavers' guild is rationed to persons willing to put
in long years of work at low wages. In effect, they buy a share of the
master's share of the guild's profits, much as the modem purchaser of stock
in a corporation that has a patent or other monopoly buys a right to receive
a proportionate share of the firm's expected monopoly profits, but the right
yields him only a competitive expected return on his investment, not a
monopoly return, because the expected monopoly profits have been discounted
in the purchase price of the stock.
12. See Bernard Elbaum, Why Apprenticeship Persisted in Britain But Not in the United States, 49
J. ECON. HIST. 337 (1989).
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The length of the apprenticeship limits the rate at which the guild expands.
Varying that length, therefore, enables the supply of labor to be adjusted
continually to meet changes in the demand for the guild's output and hence
in its derived demand for labor and other inputs, while the meager level of the
wages paid apprentices prevents the dissipation of guild rents to newcomers.
As with other guild restrictions, the length of the apprenticeship serves the
additional purpose of reinforcing the quality argument, which is the corner-
stone of the guild's public relations. With apprenticeship conceived of as a
period of training (as in part, of course, it is), the longer the period of
apprenticeship the more plausibly can the guild represent to the public that
making a high-quality product is a task requiring unusual skill that can be
acquired only by lengthy training. Finally, apprenticeship serves the important
function of screening and indoctrination of new members. Uniformity of
outlook, and with it a greater likelihood of conforming to the established
norms of pricing, workmanship, and the like, are fostered by a system in
which new producers have spent many years as students, wards, and
understudies of the old. When members died or demand grew beyond the
capacity of the existing membership to supply it, the weavers' guild could
auction off new memberships, as was later to be done with seats on stock
exchanges, another cartel institution. But that would bring into the guild
producers unlikely to internalize the guild's values-values designed to limit
competition among the members. The apprenticeship system minimizes this
risk.
I have resorted to a description of a fictional medieval craft guild in order
to bring out the moral and ideological characteristics of guilds. Even if, as I
believe, the best explanation for the guilds is that they were devices for
maximizing the net earnings of their members, the efforts that the guilds bent
to this end fostered both a particular personal morality and a particular
institutional mystique. The personal morality emphasized such values as
loyalty, equality, conformity, personal responsibility, and patient craftsman-
ship, implying scrupulous attention to detail and to quality. The institutional
mystique involved celebration of the production of exquisitely high-quality
goods or services as unique handicrafts by highly trained specialists, and the
abhorrence of cheapness and shoddiness. I shall call this mutually reinforcing
combination of morality and mystique the ideology of guild production. I have
argued that the foundation of this ideology is the self-interest of producers in
the cartelization of production; but it would be a mistake to equate guilds and
cartels. The former are a subset of the latter. The possession of an ideology
distinguishes medieval craft guilds from conventional modern cartels-and in
a way that, as we shall see, is relevant to the understanding of jurisprudence.
B. From Guild to Factory
Weavers' guilds are no more. An "industry ideology," which is the
distinguishing feature of the guild, does not survive the transition to mass
production. The conditions of such production may, as Marx argued, foster the
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creation of a workers' ideology; and over and against this we observe a
diffuse business ideology shared by many business executives. But there is no
ideology of the producing unit; as we are about to see,.there is no single
producing unit any more. A guild of weavers has an ideology; a cartel, and
especially a competitive market, of textile manufacturers does not.
Mass production involves a change in the process of production from the
handcrafting of small quantities of individualized, high-quality goods by
highly trained specialists to the machine production of large quantities of
goods of average quality, often by unskilled workers performing simple,
repetitive operations under the direction of supervisors and ultimately by
executives. 3 The division of labor within the producing unit, by breaking up
into its constituent operations the process of manufacture that was the guild's
craft, enables a greater output to be produced by a work force that may lack
anyone with the range of skills and the depth of training of a master
craftsman in a guild system. 4 The result is a heterogenous work force, no
member of which much resembles the traditional craftsman. The importance
of instilling traditional craft values in the work force therefore diminishes; so
too the value of protracted training as under a system of apprenticeship. The
workers are more like the different parts of a machine, or the different cells
of an organism, than they are like handicraftsmen, for they do not individually
produce an entire product. The values required of supervisors and executives
are especially remote from those of the guild-they are leadership values and
related "people skills," specific talents for maneuvering in large organizations,
and financial and marketing acumen. Those talents are not much used by a
person who works slowly, painstakingly, alone, or with at most the aid of one
or two apprentices.
The diversity of tasks performed by the persons who constitute the
productive enterprise in a modem industry thus dooms the moral uniformity
secured by the guild system. And with quality deemphasized and handcrafting
a thing of the past, the quality-centered mystique of the guild disappears as
well. Not only the work force, but the management force, is mobile, possessed
of general-purpose production and managerial skills rather than anchored to
a particular industry by a patient accretion of unique handicraft skills. Once,
a weaver might have been thought a kind of artist; no one would describe the
modem textile manufacturing firm as an atelier.
There is danger of overstatement here. There is craft, and not just craftiness,
in the organizational skills of the modem business executive and in the
practical technical skills of the modem factory worker, who with the growth
13. An intermediate stage is the "craft" union, in which guild-like organization of the "skilled" work
force is combined with modem methods of organizing production. The apprenticeship rules and
exclusionary practices of the craft unions are redolent of guild practices. An analogy is to the "in house"
lawyer who, as a corporate employee, is simultaneously a subordinate figure in an industrial workforce
and an independent professional.
14. HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL 79-80 (1974). It would be a mistake,
however, to suppose that modem methods of production imply wholesale "deskilling" of the labor force.
Paul Attewell, The Deskilling Controversy, 14 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 323 (1987).
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of the "total quality management" concept and Japanese-style team production
is less and less likely to be a Charlie Chaplinesque assembly-line automaton.
I need a better word than "craft" to distinguish the work of medieval guild
craftsmen from that of modem manufacturing personnel. That word is
"artisanality."' 5 It is at once broader and narrower than craft. Broader
because not limited to a member of a medieval (or any) guild; narrower
because the terms craft, craftsman, and craftsmanship can be applied to
nonartisanal activities, persons, and skills. The guild craftsman, however, was
an artisan.
The industrial counterpart of the painter or sculptor, the artisan makes
things with his hands, perhaps with some, but at most with only limited, aid
from machinery. The artisan has the satisfaction of observing a direct,
immediate, palpable, and intimate connection between his input and his
output-the satisfaction of having something tangible to show for his efforts.
The spirit of artisanality is captured in the "arts and crafts" movement that
began in the nineteenth century. "It emphasized the human touch-the care,
craftsmanship and attention to detail that go into a piece of furniture or a
decorative object that is crafted by hand. The art of creating something, it was
thought, should be a joyful, exhilarating experience, not just a way of earning
money.' 6 In addition, the artisanal mode of production promotes a stable
cartel organization of industry by limiting output.
IV. THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION; THE PROFESSION
CARTELIZED
Something like the evolution of the textile industry from guild production
to mass production, and the concomitant decline of artisanality, is occurring
today in the market for legal services. I have first to describe this evolution
and then (and last) to consider its specific consequences for jurisprudence in
the special sense in which I am using this word as denoting the ideology of
the legal profession in its guild phase.
The roots of the American legal profession are English, and by the time of
our Revolution the English legal profession had assumed something remark-
ably like its present form.'7 The profession was rigidly divided between
courtroom lawyers (the barristers) and office lawyers (the solicitors). To
become a barrister, an aspirant had to be "called to the bar" after a period of
residing and studying in an inn of court. Because such residence was costly,
and because a barrister could not work for another barrister but instead had
15. See, e.g., PAUL S. SEAVER, WALLINGTON'S WORLD: A PURITAN ARTISAN IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY LONDON, 112-42 (1985).
16. Beth Sherman, A Celebration of Beauty, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 1988, at 3.
17. The historical sketch that follows is based on RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989);
GERALD W. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
MASSACHUSETTS 1760-1840 (1979); LAWYERS IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE AND AMERICA (Wilfrid Prest
ed., 1981); and ROBERT B. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s
TO THE 1980s (1983).
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to depend on cases referred to him by solicitors, who were naturally reluctant
to refer cases to a beginner, the career of a barrister was largely although not
entirely limited to persons of independent means. As a result, the supply of
barristers was restricted, and many barristers had very high incomes, though
some-those who lost out in the barrister lottery by failing to obtain cases
from solicitors-eked out a meager living, often supplemented by moonlight-
ing, for example as a journalist. The large dispersion of lawyers' income
remains a characteristic of both the English and the American legal profession
to this day.
The successful barristers and the royal judges-virtually all of whom were
former barristers-formed a small, cozy, homogeneous community. The
common law is the expression of the values of this community. 8 The lack
of a felt need to systematize the common law by reducing it to a code is a
reflection of the community's homogeneity. They had no more need for a
code than the native speakers in a language community need a grammar book
to know how to speak.
To become a solicitor in eighteenth-century England, one had to serve a
period of years as an articled clerk, that is, as a solicitor's apprentice. So
entry into the solicitors' branch of the profession was controlled too.
Solicitors were allowed only one articled clerk at a time, which limited the
growth of the profession.
The situation in the colonies, and in the new nation, was more fluid.
Although lawyers had played a prominent role in the founding, and constituted
in Tocqueville's view the nearest thing that the United States had to an
aristocracy, the public was hostile to guild-like restrictions and privileges. The
division between barristers and solicitors never took hold. Many judges were
elected rather than appointed; they mostly did not wear the robe-the symbol
of the judge's, as of the clergyman's, specialness-and their powers over
juries were severely limited. In short, the idea of a legal caste was resisted.
Before the Civil War, two states abolished all restrictions on entry into the
legal profession other than that the entrant be an adult of good moral
character.' 9 Other states were more restrictive, generally requiring an
apprenticeship. But I conjecture that the real limitation on the size of the
profession was the generally low standard of education in nineteenth-century
America. Law was then, as it is today, an intellectually demanding profession
(whether it has to be is a separate question). While a brilliant person like
Abraham Lincoln could become a successful lawyer with little formal
education, the pool of persons from which such lawyers could emerge must
have been small, just like the pool of persons from which opera singers and
professional athletes emerge-two unregulated occupations famous for high
18. A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW
8 (William Twining ed., 1986), reprinted in A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY:
ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 359 (1987).
19. STEVENS, supra note 17, at 7.
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salaries, though also, as one would expect-the high salaries acting as a
magnet-a high variance in salaries.
Educational standards rose, and for that or other reasons the latter part of
the century witnessed a movement, rich in parallels to developments occurring
at the same time in the medical profession, toward making the American legal
profession a restricted occupation. We may date the beginning of this
movement to 1870, when Christopher Columbus Langdell became dean of the
Harvard Law School. His program of educational reform2 was explicitly
based on the premise that law was a science. That premise made it natural to
suppose that lawyers should undergo a lengthy period of preparation at a
university-where else would one develop scientists? From there it is but a
step, though a big step (and one not taken by real sciences), to making them
undergo that preparation as a condition of being permitted -to engage in
professional activity. The step was not complete until apprenticeship (clerking
in a lawyer's office, the equivalent of the English articled clerkship) as an
alternative route to qualifying to take the bar exam was abolished and until
bar cram schools were disaccredited, although they survive to this day as the
bar-review courses that newly graduated law students take for the few weeks
between graduating from law school and taking the bar exam. As late as 1951,
twenty percent of American lawyers had not graduated from law school, and
fifty percent had not graduated from college.2' But by 1960, four years of
college (more precisely, a college degree, which rarely is earned in fewer
years), plus three years at an accredited law school, plus receipt of a passing
grade on the bar exam administered by the state in which the candidate
wanted to practice, plus satisfying a character committee of the bar that he
was of sound moral character, formed a series of hoops through which almost
everyone who wanted to become a licensed practitioner of law in this country
had to jump.
The barrier to new entry created by these hoops was reinforced by other
state imposed restrictions. The most important was the prohibition-without
which the educational requirements would have had little restrictive
effect-against the unauthorized practice of law. Not only were persons who
had not been admitted to the bar of a state forbidden to call themselves
lawyers; they could not perform the services that the state defined as the
practice oflaw-mainly the representation of litigants before courts and most
administrative agencies, and the sale of legal advice. Nonlawyers were kept
from circumventing this prohibition by being forbidden to enter into
partnership with lawyers or otherwise to obtain an ownership interest in
enterprises providing legal services.
Besides limiting entry into the profession and preventing competition by
outsiders with the profession's members, the law limited competition within
20. See Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329 (1979).
Harvard President Charles W. Eliot actually played a "more significant role" than Langdell in the
development of these reforms. Id. at 332.
21. DIETRICH RuESCmEMEYER, LAwYERs AND THEIR SoCIETy: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IN GERMANY AND IN THE UNITED STATES 105 (1973).
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the profession by forbidding most forms of soliciting business (including
"ambulance chasing" and advertising), by encouraging lawyers to price their
services according to fees set by the state bar association, and by limiting
interstate mobility of lawyers. A lawyer was permitted to practice only in the
courts of a state of which he was both a resident and, by virtue of having
passed the state's bar exam and satisfying the state's other requirements for
licensing, a member of the state's bar. However, some states permitted
admission on motion, that is, without having to take another bar exam, if the
applicant had practiced law in a state that provided reciprocal privileges. Even
then he would have to become a resident of the state whose bar he was
seeking to join. The prohibitions that I have mentioned against "lay intermedi-
aries" (the employment of a lawyer by a nonlawyer, for example by a
corporation seeking to market legal services to clients), and against unautho-
rized practice, limited competition within as well as with the legal profession
by making it more difficult for law firms to expand.
What I have described as restrictions on competition within the profession
are also restrictions on new entry into specific markets within the profession.
Advertising, and access to efficient capital markets, are more important for
new entrants than for existing firms, because the latter have already
established their reputations and accumulated their capital. Even if an
enterprising lawyer, perceiving unusual profit opportunities in a state in which
the supply of legal services was especially restricted, went to the bother of
obtaining a license in that state-and the bother might be considerable, might
be the reason the supply of lawyers in the state was so restricted-he would
not be able to use the common methods by which a new firm in a market
seeks to wrest customers from the existing firms.
Yet in a market of thousands of sellers-for no state has fewer than a
thousand lawyers and many have many times that number, with the national
total approaching 800,000 at this writing-concern over the limitations on
entry into the profession's markets might seem academic. Would there not be
enough licensed sellers of legal services in every significant locality to
guarantee vigorous competition-and thus thwart any efforts at carteliza-
tion-even if new entry were blocked completely? But we should distinguish
between a cartel of producers of goods and a cartel of providers of personal
services. While the latter is likely to have a larger membership, which will
increase the costs of coordination and of preventing cheating, it is much more
difficult for an individual to increase his output of a personal service than it
is for a firm to increase its output of a product. The individual who belongs
to a cartel may have more incentive to cheat than a corporate member would
have but a good deal less capability of doing so. A firm can hire additional
workers, build a larger factory, buy more machinery and supplies, and add
more executives. Only gradually will it encounter diseconomies of scale that
limit its growth. Personal services are different-although, as we shall see,
less so than the providers of them believe. There are only so many hours in
the year, and therefore only so many operations a highly skilled surgeon can
perform, only so many trials that even the best trial lawyer can conduct, only
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so many clients that the best legal counselor can advise. Even the world's best
and cheapest lawyer, assisted by the most skilled and serviceable assistants,
can supply only a tiny fraction of the market's demand for trial counsel.
Rubens expanded his output by hiring assistants to paint the lesser figures in
his massive paintings; but, even so, the amount of his personal attention that
was required was too great to permit him to engage in mass production.
This point shows that even if it is totally infeasible to fix the price of legal
services-a further difficulty being the heterogeneous character of those
services-or to limit the output of individual lawyers or law firms, so long as
the number of lawyers is limited some lawyers, at least, will enjoy monopoly
returns.22 So limiting entry becomes the focus of the professional cartel. This
in turn makes government assistance more important to professional cartels
than to ordinary producer cartels. The latter can, by fixing prices or limiting
output, make monopoly profits for a time, although new entry will eliminate
those profits eventually. But control of entry is essential to a professional
cartel, because the large number of its members is bound to make the
coordination of prices and of output and the detection of cheaters very
difficult to effectuate. And without government assistance it is virtually
impossible to keep out new entrants. Despite a vast theoretical literature on
the use of predatory tactics to discourage entry, instances of successful use of
such tactics are rare and almost all involve single firm monopolies rather than
cartels, since the coordinated employment of predatory tactics is particularly
difficult to pull off. Government on the other hand, through a requirement that
providers of a specified service have a license, can limit entry rather easily.
So we should expect to find that durable, effective professional cartels are
government supported.
Another difference between professional and producer cartels is that
products generally are easier to define or distinguish among than professional
services. Steel, aluminum, automobiles, oil, plumbing fixtures, and coffee are
both visible and visibly distinct from one another in a way in which many
legal services and medical services are not. If a lawyer hires a professional
actor to read the script, written by the lawyer, of the lawyer's closing
argument to the jury, is the actor practicing law? (An interpreter would not
be; nor the lawyer's tailor-yet clothes are a form of statement.) Is drafting
a will the practice of law? Creating a trust? Giving legal advice? Doing legal
research for a lawyer? Indexing the record in a trial? Ghostwriting a judge's
opinions? Teaching law to law students? How about to business students?
Proofreading a bond indenture? Representing litigants in a tax court or before
22. Even with no restrictions, some lawyers would earn economic rents (returns greater than they
could earn in any other activity), just as some opera singers, who compete in an unregulated industry,
earn economic rents. But a rent to a factor of production that is in irremediably short supply relative to
demand must be distinguished from a rent to a factor of production the supply of which is limited by
agreement or regulation-only the rent resulting from a contrived, an artificial, an imposed scarcity is
a true monopoly return. We shall see that in a completely competitive, totally unregulated market for
legal services, some lawyers would have higher economic rents than in a regulated market for such
services even though no lawyers would have monopoly returns.
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a social security or veterans' disability tribunal? Bringing business into a law
firm? Collecting overdue bills? Insuring real estate titles? Conveying real
estate? Conveying an automobile? Interviewing potential witnesses? Serving
as a commercial arbitrator? As a mediator? Is public sanitation the practice
of medicine? Is setting simple fractures? Performing first trimester abortions?
Treating neuroses? Administering enemas? Giving flu injections? Faith
healing? Prescribing exercises for a sore back? Correcting vision? Pulling
teeth? Prescribing a diet for losing weight? It should be apparent from these
examples that to limit entry into a profession effectively it is not enough to
place obstacles in the path of those who want to call themselves lawyers or
doctors or whatever. It is also necessary to define the profession in a way that
prevents competing sellers of personal services from taking away much of the
profession's business, in the way that psychologists for example have taken
away much of the medical and religious professions' business of ministering
to people's mental health, and that banks and trust companies have taken
away much of the legal profession's probate and conveyancing business.
I have called the demarcation of professional services entry limiting, but it
could equally well be called demand increpsing. The demand for a
profession's services will be greater the greater the scope of those services.
Defining an increase in demand as economists do, as the willingness of
consumers to buy more of a product at any.given price for it, we can see that
an increase in the demand for a cartel's product or service could increase the
cartel's output without causing the price to fall, so that the cartel's profits
would increase. Another way in which a cartel can increase demand is by
inducing the government to subsidize that demand, for example by paying for
a poor person's lawyer. But demand-increasing measures are double-edged
swords from a cartel's standpoint, a fact that helps explain the long opposition
of the medical and legal professions to government subsidization of their
services. When demand is rising, a cartel has more difficulty detecting the
cheaters in its ranks because the "honest" members may not lose sales but
may merely grow more slowly than the cheaters-and may not even know that
they are growing more slowly. If, moreover, a professional cartel, in the
interest of preserving its cohesiveness, does not expand output in response to
growing demand, public and competitive pressure to allow new entry may
become overpowering as prices soar to ration the existing and now insufficient
supply to the newly expanded demand. Because it is so difficult for an
individual to expand his output of personal services, the only way to expand
the supply of professional services to meet an increased demand may be to
admit new members. Increasing the size of the cartel can, however, magnify
the disintegrative pressures that afflict all cartels. It can do this both directly
and indirectly by forcing the profession to admit new members who do not
share the values of the old, perhaps because they are drawn from ethnic
groups formerly barred from the profession.
My description of the guild system emphasized the intimate relation
between cartelization and quality. Here I add with specific reference to
professional cartels that cartelization can improve a profession's average
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quality even if the selection or credentialing mechanism operates randomly
with respect to quality (it could be a lottery system, for example). All that is
necessary is that it limit the number of persons in the profession. For then
their average income will be higher, which will raise the average quality of
candidates for the profession unless the existing members of the profession
are able to impose an apprenticeship system that will prevent newcomers from
sharing in the monopoly rents that cartelization generates.
Another source of upward pressure on quality, not in all professions but in
the legal and military professions, is that these are adversarial professions in
a way that medicine for example is not. Bacteria do not become smarter when
doctors become smarter. (Well, that is not quite true; bacteria may evolve
resistant strains in response to an effective new drug.) But the better the
lawyer on one side of a case is, the greater will be the value to the opposing
party of having a good lawyer on his side. Better quality of lawyers may
conduce to better quality of decisions, however, so the quality competition of
lawyers is not the zero-sum game that the quality competition of the armed
forces of potential enemies is. Although I am not attempting to compare the
social benefits and costs of a cartelized versus a competitive legal profession,
I do want to emphasize that there are benefits as well as costs. If cartelization
results in higher quality lawyers who produce higher quality briefs, judges'
decisions will tend to be of higher quality and this will confer benefits on the
community as a whole.
While it is easy to see how many, probably most, lawyers benefit from
cartelization of the profession, a complete analysis of the economics of
professionalization would require explaining how a group composed of
hundreds of thousands of individuals can overcome free rider obstacles to
collective action to the extent of being able to obtain governmental support
for a cartel. (But we know they can: think of farmers.) I can merely venture
upon a possible answer here. Because the profession is so large, because a
perceptible if small fraction of its members have a palpable self-interest in
maintaining the professional cartel, and because the social costs of such a
cartel are both highly diffuse and only dimly perceived, the free rider problem
need not be insoluble. Provided that existing practitioners are grandfathered
whenever some new entry barrier is created (such as graduation from an
accredited law school), the entire cost of the barrier will fall on prospective
entrants to the profession-many of whom have not begun to think about
entering the profession and some of whom have not even been born-and on
consumers of legal services.
Some states have an "integrated" bar, meaning that to practice law a lawyer
must belong to the state bar association. In effect he is taxed to support the
cartel enhancing activities of the association, and so the free rider problem is
overcome. Of course we should ask how a state comes to have an integrated
bar. Whose self-interest was served by taking a leading role in plumping for
such an institution? A possible answer is that a part-time investment in bar
association activities pays dividends in legal fees by making a lawyer better
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known to his fellow lawyers, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will
refer cases to him that they lack the time to handle themselves.
And universities, especially after Langdell's system of case law instruction,
which is feasible (some think optimal) with a very low ratio of faculty to
students, and hence is cheap, had and have an interest in promoting a
requirement that lawyers graduate from a three-year law school.23 Existing
universities also have a pecuniary interest in accreditation standards that will
limit competition from new schools, such as the dreaded "proprietary" (profit-
making) professional schools. Law professors have an interest in raising the
quality of the legal profession too, because better students are more rewarding
to teach, and in preserving the system of regulation that requires people who
want to practice law to attend law schools for a lengthy fixed period.24 One
rarely finds law professors, whether they are radicals or libertarians,
inveighing against the cartel restrictions of the profession.
V. GUILD AND PROFESSION COMPARED
We can begin to sense ideological parallels, and to understand their common
material basis, between the medieval craft guild, and the modem legal
profession as it stood on the eve of the transformation of the market for legal
services that began (at first very gradually) around 1960. In both forms of
market organization, the guild and the profession, an aid to, and perhaps even
a condition of, successful cartelization is the creation of an ideological rather
than a purely contractual community. This community genteelly resists the
"commodification" of its output-resists, that is, the commercial values of
competition, innovation, consumer sovereignty, and the deliberate pursuit of
profit. "Plumbing is still prosecuted too largely for the plumber's profit. It is
therefore a handicraft, not a profession.125 We can hear the echo of the
quality argument for restricting competition. For an ethic of individuality and
rivalry is substituted one of cooperation and solidarity.
A profession is a brotherhood-almost, if the word could be purified of its
invidious implications, a caste. Professional activities are so definite, so
absorbing in interest, so rich in duties and responsibilities that they
completely engage their votaries. The social and personal lives of
professional men and their families thus tend to organize around a
professional nucleus. A strong class consciousness soon develops. 26
Central to this consciousness, despite Flexner's dismissive attitude toward
mere "handicrafts," is a mystique akin to artisanship. Brandeis liked to boast
that judges-unlike other high government officials, who preside over
23. A qualification is necessary. Reducing the length of law school to, say, two years could, by
making a legal education much cheaper, so increase the number of entering students as to offset the loss
of students in the third year.
24. Again, subject to the qualification in the preceding footnote.
25. Abraham Flexner, Is Social Work a Profession?, 1 SCH. & Soc'Y 901, 905 (1915); see also
Louis D. BRANDEIS, BusNEss-A PROFESSION 2 (1914).
26. Flexner, supra note 25, at 904.
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bureaucracies akin to those of large business firms-do their own work; and
Henry Hart wrote, with what in retrospect seems astonishing na~vet6, that
"writing opinions is the most time-consuming of all judicial work, and the
least susceptible of effective assistance from a law clerk. '27 He either did not
know or would not say that by 1959 a majority of the Supreme Court's
opinions were being written by law clerks; today, a judge-written opinion, at
any level of the American judiciary, is rare. The fact that legal services are
personal services rather than products, and hence resistant to automation,
made plausible the idea that artisanship, epitomized in the "handcrafting" of
a judicial opinion, supplies the criterion of professional excellence. Some
personal services, it is true, have become highly standardized, but the arts
remain a bastion (albeit an embattled one) of artisanship and to its votaries
law is an art-so that the open acknowledgment that neophytes can, after only
three years of professional instruction and no professional experience, do
much of the principal work of judges more or less satisfactorily, or at least
not shockingly badly, still has the capacity to undermine professional self-
esteem. It is a little as if brain surgeons delegated the entire performance of
delicate operations to nurses, orderlies, and first-year medical students-and
patients were none the worse for it. Of course only judges (and there are
some, lut not many) who allow their law clerks to dictate the judges' votes
are delegating the entire performance of the "operation." Nor is the judicial
function exhausted in voting and opinion writing; there are also conferring,
editing, questioning counsel, and other tasks. Still, so central has judicial
opinion-writing seemed to the conception of legal "craft" that revelations
about how heavily appellate judges and even Supreme Court Justices rely on
ghostwriters28 continue to roil the smooth surface of professional self-esteem.
To put all this very succinctly, the professions advance "[c]laims to esoteric
knowledge and unselfish service. 29 In the even more cynical summary of the
eighteenth-century Scottish professor of medicine John Gregory, professionals
practice "unworthy arts to raise their importance among the ignorant,"
including "an affectation of mystery in all their writings and conversations
relating to their profession; an affectation of knowledge, inscrutable to all,
except the adepts in the science; an air of perfect confidence in their own skill
and abilities; and a demeanor solemn, contemptuous, and highly expressive
of self-sufficiency."3 We shall see some of these qualities reflected in
Professor Wechsler's famous article on neutral principles in constitutional
law.
Restrictions on the size of enterprises and the delegation of work to
subordinates help enforce the ideal of artisanality by retarding the adoption
of mass production methods. Emphasis on formal education attracts
27. Hart, supra note 1, at 91.
28. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Next Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 12, 1993, at 21.
29. Marie Haug, The Sociological Approach to Self-Regulation, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS,
supra note 7, at 61, 63.
30. JEFFREY L. BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY: A STUDY OF MEDICINE IN THE UNITED
STATES AND GREAT BITAIN 89 (1975).
19931
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
intellectually agile aspirants whose forensic and analytic efforts intellectualize
professional activity, making that activity increasingly impenetrable by the lay
understanding. And the homogeneity of the required training produces a
degree of consensus on professional issues that convinces the practitioners
that they have a pipeline to the truth-techniques of discovery comparable to
that of natural scientists. Thus, the intellectual characteristics of the activity
of law-the complexity of its doctrines, the obscurity of its jargon, and the
objectification of "the law"-are, in part at least, endogenous to the
organization of the legal profession, rather than exogenous factors to which
the profession has adapted by, for example, setting high and uniform
standards for qualification.
The point about the objectification of law is particularly important for
understanding what I am calling "jurisprudence."'31 Two circumstances
among others can generate agreement on disputed matters. One is an external
reference point to which the disputants can appeal for an authoritative
determination. The referent to which natural scientists appeal is the set of
things ("nature") that exist independently of human thought. Another enforcer
of consensus is the homogeneity of the inquirers. People who have the same
training and experiences tend to look at things the same way. But they are
unlikely to conclude that they agree because they are alike as peas in a pod.
Instead, they will ascribe their agreement to the fact that they are wielding
tools of inquiry powerful enough to penetrate appearances to a reality that
exists outside themselves and that furnishes the same kind of guidance that
nature furnishes to natural scientists. (To believers in natural law, it is indeed
the same "nature" that is guiding both inquiries.) Most scientists would say
that they believe that the earth revolves around the sun because the earth
really does revolve around the sun, and they would be right; and most lawyers
would say that the Supreme Court held that public school segregation violates
the law because such segregation really does violate "the law." Are they right
in the same sense? Jurisprudence has long been preoccupied with the
exploration of this mysterious politico-ethical entity, which has a more than
accidental resemblance to corresponding entities in religion, such as "God" in
monotheistic religions. Were the legal profession socially heterogeneous, it
would not delude itself that legal consensus was as it were coerced by
external reality. So, with the profession becoming in fact more heterogeneous
in recent decades, belief in "the law" has, indeed, diminished.
If religious fanatics succeed through the persecution of dissenters in
enforcing uniformity of religious belief, they do not infer that the resulting
lack of disagreement is the result of persecution. They infer that it is the
result of the fact that theirs is the true faith.
The radical wing of the legal profession-the critical legal studies
movement-has nothing but contempt for the traditional lawyer's belief in the
objectivity of his inquiry. Inconsistently, however, it does not advocate the
31. What follows in this paragraph is a principal theme of my book, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
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deregulation of the legal services industry. Duncan Kennedy, who advocates
the random assignment of faculty and students to law schools and a Chinese
Cultural Revolution style rotation of law jobs among lawyers and janitors,
accepts "the forced exclusion of many aspirants to legal careers. 3 2 For him,
the injustice is not that people can buy legal services only from licensed
sellers, but that the licenses are not assigned to the right people. I conjecture
that the cause of this blind spot in the radicals' critique of the legal profession
is not only self-interest; it is also nostalgia for the communitarian ideology of
a craft guild or a professional cartel, because it is an ideology that elevates
solidarity and cooperation over individualism and competition.
VI. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CARTELIZED PROFESSION
With the benefit of hindsight, 1960 can be identified as the highwater mark
of the American legal profession's cartel, and hence of jurisprudence
conceived of as the ideology of the legal profession's guild or cartel, rather
than merely as a stuffy, old-fashioned term for legal theory. All the restric-
tions that the organized bar had striven for were in place, and the number of
lawyers who had hurdled the fence before it had been raised-that is, had
become lawyers before lengthy formal education had become a prerequisite
to admission to the profession-was in irreversible decline. Potentially rival
systems of regulation and dispute resolution, such as the administrative
process and arbitration, which the judiciary and the legal profession had once
fought, had been successfully lawyerized and were no longer a competitive
threat. Among symptoms of noncompetitive pricing and other monopolistic
behavior in the heyday of the cartel were the prevalence of "value of service"
pricing (billing by the hour became common and eventually dominant only
after 1960),"3 the cult of meticulous craftsmanship and of long hours
(representing the transformation of price into nonprice competition), the
queuing for places in law school classes and for admission to the bar in
desirable locations such as California and Florida, and discrimination by elite
firms against Jews,34 women, and other "nongentlemanly" sorts who might
be less prone to cooperate in preventing and avoiding competition and whose
presence might in addition reduce the nonpecuniary income of the members
of these firms by requiring undesired personal associations. 35 The "ethical"
32. DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC
AGAINST THE SYSTEM 53 (1983).
33. William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 11 (1991).
On price-fixing by lawyers, see Richard J. Amould, Pricing Professional Services: A Case Study of the
Legal Service Industry, 39 S. ECON. J. 495 (1972).
34. Though already on the wane by 1960, it was an old concern. STEVENS, supra note 17, at 184
n.41, records concerns voiced in 1929 about the entry of "Russian Jew boys" into the profession.
Compare Wigmore's call for "a requirement of two years of college" as "a beneficent measure for
reducing hereafter the spawning mass of promiscuous semi-intelligence which now enters the bar." John
H. Wigmore, Should the Standard ofAdmission to the Bar Be Based on Two Years or More of College-
Grade Education? It Should, 4 AM. L. SCH. REv. 30, 31 (1915).
35. For analogies in medicine, see REU3EN A. KESSEL, ESSAYS IN APPLIED PRICE THEORY, chs.
1-3, 9 (RH. Coase & Merton H. Miller eds., 1980).
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obligation of lawyers to devote a certain amount of their time to "pro bono"
(unpaid) work-an obligation that has no counterpart in competitive markets
and that is now in decline as the legal profession has become more competi-
tive-limits the supply of legal services to the market while jacking up the
demand, since the more legal assistance that indigents have, the more paid
legal assistance their adversaries (mainly prosecutors, landlords, finance
companies, and installment sellers) need. One bit of evidence of the relation
between the price of legal services and competitive restrictions on their supply
is that in this period, German lawyers had on average higher relative incomes
than American lawyers-and restrictions on competition in the German legal
profession were more severe than in the American profession.1
6
The condition of the profession in 1960 helps explain the celebration of
traditional legal craftsmanship by Henry Hart" and, less obviously, the
puzzling discomfiture of the professional elite with the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, which held that public school segregation was a denial
of the equal protection of the laws.38 The problem with Brown from the
perspective of professional ideology was threefold:
1. The minor premise of the decision-that segregation was harmful to
blacks, whether by stamping them with a badge of inferiority, depriving them
of a quality education, or denying them valuable associations with white
persons, or all three, and that this stigmatization and these deprivations were
the original and continuing objectives of segregation-was obvious and had
been so from the inception of the practice. This was embarrassing in two
ways. First, if so palpable a form of deliberate and invidious racial discrimi-
nation had existed for more than a century, as it had, why had the Supreme
Court taken so long to invalidate it? Why in particular had it upheld
segregation in 1897, in the Plessy opinion which Brown in effect over-
ruled?39 (Needless to say, neither the Brown opinion itself nor the uncom-
fortable professional commentary remarked this point.) Second, a judicial
decision based on grounds obvious to the lay public is professionally
uninteresting, even a little threatening. Nothing in Chief Justice Warren's
opinion marked it as the product of a first-rate legal mind. It lacked subtlety,
elegance, and eloquence. In fact the opinion, probably written by Warren
himself rather than by a law clerk, was not the product of a first-rate legal
mind. Much intelligent lawyerly maneuvering had occurred behind the scenes
and the "all deliberate speed" remedial formula announced in the second
Brown opinion was a neat bit of legal legerdemain.4" But the Supreme
36. For both points, see RUESCHEMEYER, supra note 21, at 63-65, 132, 135-38.
37. See supra text accompanying note 27.
38. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Herbert Weehsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-35 (1959). Weehsler's article was published in book form
as HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1961), but my page
references are to the article.
39. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
40. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown 11); see also RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); Philip Elman & Norman Silber, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice
Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1987);
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Court's main opinion in the most important judicial decision of the century
was banal.
2. While the minor premise of the decision was too obvious to be congenial,
the major premise was too difficult. It was unclear, to say the least, that the
framers or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment had intended the Equal
Protection Clause to prevent racially segregated public education. To decide
whether their intentions should count-even how their intentions should be
characterized (because they could have had general -intentions, such as to
promote racial equality, that were inconsistent with their specific intentions,
such as to preserve the subordinate social position of blacks)-would have
required a theory of interpretation that the legal profession lacked in 1954, as
it lacks today, so that the debate over the soundness of Brown v. Board of
Education as constitutional interpretation continues.4 The suspicion persists
that the Court outlawed public school segregation because it thought it an evil
practice rather than because it suddenly woke up to the fact that the practice
had been declared unlawful in a constitutional amendment ratified almost a
century earlier.
3. Whatever its motive or juridical content, the Brown decision was
politically highly consequential-it thrust the Supreme Court into the midst
of a power struggle between the southern and the northern states and in that
respect could be thought a reprise of the Dred Scott decision. The artisanal
perspective is resolutely antipolitical. It wants law for law's sake (like art for
art's sake), not for politics' sake. To alter the analogy, the farther the courts
steer clear of political controversy, the more likely judicial inquiry is to
resemble scientific truth-seeking. Scientists want to keep clear of politics too,
and for the same reason. The professional is happy to be thought of as a kind
of artist or a kind of scientist, even as a kind of social scientist, or a "social
engineer," but not as a kind of politician. He is content, though perhaps not
ecstatic, to be thought an artisan, surrendering any claim to originality, vision,
or audacity in exchange for society's acknowledging his possession of
unchallengeable expertise within however narrow a sphere of social gover-
nance.
One might suppose that these points against Brown would be thought merely
costs to be traded off against the social benefits from invalidating an unjust
institution. But it is no part of professional ideology to run risks for the sake
of social gains. The risks are to the profession, the gains to the larger society.
Lawyers, like other people, are inclined to set their own welfare, and that of
their profession, above the interests that they have in common with the
population at large.
Mark Tushnet, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867
(1991).
41. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, 'Interpreting' the Constitution: Posner on Bork 44 STAN. L. REV.
1019, 1037-43 (1992).
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VII. THE CRISIS OF THE PROFESSION
So stood the American legal profession in 1960, on the eve of revolution.
Today all is changed, changed utterly.4 2 Although the profession has not
been thrown open to free entry, an accelerating accumulation of legal and
especially economic changes over the past three decades has transformed the
profession decisively in the direction of competitive enterprise. It is not so
profound a transformation as that from the medieval weavers' guild to the
modem mass production textile industry-it does not signify the
deprofessionalization, let alone the proletarianization, of the legal profes-
sion.43 But there are sufficient parallels between the transformation of
weaving and the recent changes in the structure of the legal profession to
make the analogy an illuminating one.
Although part of a larger movement aptly described as the "industrialization
of service,"" the fundamental cause of the transformation of the legal
profession has undoubtedly been the surge in demand for legal services. The
causes of the surge are not well understood, though some causal factors, such
as the creation of new rights, much higher crime rates, greatly relaxed rules
of standing, more generous legal remedies (including relaxed standards for
class actions) as part of a general tilt in favor of civil plaintiffs and against
civil defendants, and the increased subsidization of lawyers for indigent
criminal defendants and indigent civil plaintiffs, can readily be identified. But
its existence cannot be doubted. The most conspicuous manifestations are the
"litigation explosion" and the concomitant rapid growth in the number of
lawyers.45 While it is popularly believed that lawyers create their own
demand, it is hardly plausible that the vast expansion in legal rights and
regulations in recent decades is the consequence of an increase in the number
of junior lawyers. For when the legal profession expands, it does so much less
by lateral entry of mature, influential persons (for although some people do
switch into law from other occupations, they invariably are junior members
42. For documentation, see, most recently, Sharyn L. Roach Anleu, The Legal Profession in the
United States and Australia: Deprofessionalization or Reorganization?, 19 WORK & OCCUPA71ONS 184
(1992). See also ABEL, supra note 17; MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, ToURNAMENT OF
LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS wrH
POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988); Robert A. Rothman,
Deprofessionalization: The Case of Law in America, 11 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 183 (1984); Richard
H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent
Market, 14 J.L. & SOC. INQUIRY 431 (1989). Of course, lawyers have been crying "crisis" for a long
time. Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in
LAWYERs' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION
144 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992). But the wolf is finally at the door.
43. Anleu, supra note 42, at 194, points out sensibly that specialization, large firms, advertising,
and other trends in the legal profession need not result in "deprofessionalization" in the sense of loss
of autonomy and status, though it is likely to alter the distribution of rewards within the profession.
44. Theodore Levitt, The Industrialization of Service, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 63.
Levitt points out that the service sector was built on the model of the traditional relation between a
servant and his master. The idea of the lawyer as a high-class servant of the rich is traditional. It is
illustrated by Dickens's treatment of the lawyer Tulkinghorn in BLEAK HOUSE.
45. See Sherwin Rosen, The Market for Lawyers, 35 J.L. & ECON. 215, 219 (1992).
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of those occupations) than by an expansion in the number of law students
which gradually works its way through the profession.
The accommodation of the vastly increased demand for legal services has
taken a variety of forms, all of which involve expanding the supply of those
services. That was not an inevitable response. As I suggested earlier, the
greater demand could in principle have been accommodated if not exactly
satisfied by price rationing that would have shunted people into other systems
of dispute resolution-political, arbitral, informal, internal, whatever.4 6
Instead, the supply of legal services was expanded through increases in the
number of suppliers, increased competition among suppliers, and technical and
organizational innovations that enhanced the productivity of legal services.
The first response is illustrated by the creation of new law schools, the
expansion of existing ones, and the reduction in the rate of flunking out
students-developments that together enabled an enormous increase in the size
of the legal profession, which has grown from 213,000 lawyers in 1960'7 to
almost 800,000 today. The motor for this expansion in supply was competition
among law firms to add new associates and partners in order to supply the
rising demand for legal services. The competition increased the incomes of
lawyers, thereby attracting more students to law school. The surge in demand
for places in law school enabled the law schools not only to expand (and
enabled new law schools to be created) but also to screen applicants more
carefully (since the pool was larger and abler) and thus increase the
percentage of students that actually graduated and became lawyers.
The second response to the rising demand for legal services-increased
competition within the profession-is the result in part of a series of decisions
by the Supreme Court that invalidated, on one ground or another, a number
of traditional restrictions on competition among lawyers. The judge-made
exemption of the learned professions from antitrust law has gone, and with it
price-fixing by bar associations. Most limitations on lawyers' advertising, not
only media advertising but also the direct solicitation of legal business from
persons having potential legal claims, have been invalidated, as have many
barriers to lawyers' relocating to other states than the ones in which they were
originally licensed.
Technical and organizational innovations have increased the vigor of
competition in the legal services market, but they also have an independent
significance for the transformation of the profession. The rise of the paralegal,
for example, has demonstrated that much of the traditional work of lawyers
can be and is being done by nonlawyers. It has also made the production of
legal services a less homogeneous activity. The heavy use of computers for
document preparation, indexing, and legal research, and of facsimile machines
and other communications equipment, has increased the traditionally low
46. For example, a wave of mergers between firms standing in a supplier-customer relation to each
other will transform many disputes between suppliers and customers, disputes characteristically resolved
by litigation, into intrafirm disputes resolved by the fiat of supervisors.
47. RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: C~isis AND REFORM 80 (1985).
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capital requirements of law firms, raising the minimum efficient size of firms
and hence contributing to the astonishing growth in the average size of firms,
some of which now have more than a thousand lawyers. 48 Another factor in
that growth has been the increasing importance of litigation in law firms' mix
of business, a change due in part to corporate clients' taking more of their
nonlitigation legal business in-house. The incidence and demands of litigation
are inherently unpredictable, so an increase in the size of a firm enables a
better smoothing of the firm's load.
Old believers in antitrust law might suppose that a growth in average firm
size would conduce to monopoly or oligopoly. That has not been the
experience of the legal services industry. The growing size of firms has
facilitated their expansion into different geographical and service markets,
increasing competition. (The analogy is to banking: an unregulated banking
industry that had ten banks in it would probably be more competitive than our
existing, regulated industry which contains 14,000 banks.) As the legal
problems of business firms grow, more and more firms find it profitable to
create large in-house legal staffs, which not only provide greater competition
for law firms but also enable corporate clients to engage in shrewder
negotiations with them-to play off one against the other, to solicit competi-
tive bids, and so forth-thus further stimulating competition among law firms.
We should not be surprised that the price of legal service fell, not as popular
and professional opinion alike supposes rose, between 1970 and 1985. 49 The
increasing ratio of associate to partner income is consistent with the
hypothesis of growing competition: the reduction in monopsony power has
increased law firms' labor costs.
As law firms grow, opportunities for professional specialization-for a more
complete division of labor-grow apace. I mentioned the paralegal. Large law
firms also hire professional managers, English professors, accountants,
economists, computer experts, and other nonlawyer specialists to perform
services formerly performed by lawyers. Lawyers become proficient in narrow
fields of law or in particular techniques, learn to work in large teams, and
engage in activities characteristic of competition-such as marketing-or of
large enterprises-such as supervision. Competition makes them work harder,
too, and reduces their security of tenure-so there are more and more cases
of firms dissolving, restructuring, regrouping; of firms firing associates and
even partners; and of wide fluctuations in earnings within firms.
These changes have psychological as well as narrowly economic conse-
quences. Harder work, even when well remunerated, greater uncertainty of
tenure, and the inevitably bureaucratic "feel" of practicing law in a huge
organization all reduce job satisfaction. Many lawyers claim with evident
sincerity not to enjoy the practice of law as much as they once did. Many say
they would not have gone to law school had they known what the practice of
48. The increasing sophistication of personal computers, and the falling price of electronic products
generally may, however, be reducing minimum efficient firm size.
49. Sander & Williams, supra note 42, at 451.
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law would become. The increasingly competitive character of the legal
services market makes lawyers feel like hucksters rather than the proud
professionals they once were, and brings forward to positions of leadership in
the profession persons whose talents, for example for marketing ("rainmak-
ing"), are those of competitive business rather than of professionalism. Gone
are the joys of artisanality and the security of the guild.
We can find traces of the changes in lawyers' work in two characteristic
products of the legal profession-the appellate brief, and the appellate
opinion. It used to be that both sorts of documents were the product of a legal
professional, whether mature lawyer or judge, working essentially by himself,
though with advice from others. The author of the brief or opinion was not
only-it went without saying-an experienced professional; he was an
experienced legal writer. The craft of writing legal-rhetorical documents, such
as briefs and opinions, was central to his professional self-image. No longer.
Brief writing in large law firms, government agencies, and other influential
legal enterprises is now generally delegated to the least experienced
lawyers-new associates and summer associates. True, these young lawyers
work under supervision; theirs is first-draft, not final-draft, responsibility. But
anyone who writes knows that he who writes the first draft controls to a great
extent the final product. The craft of the senior lawyer in relation to brief
writing is now that of a supervisor skilled at eliciting and improving the best
work of his juniors.
A parallel evolution has occurred with respect to opinion writing. Today,
as I have said, the vast majority of judicial opinions at all appellate levels are
drafted by law clerks, most of whom are only a year or two out of law school.
The appellate judge's main role remains that of deciding the case, but for the
secondary role of writer he (or, increasingly, she) has substituted that of
supervisor. This division of labor, with its echo of the transformation from
guild to factory production, enables the judiciary to dispose of a vastly larger
number of cases with no marked (perhaps no) diminution of average quality.
It is an efficient adaptation to the greater demand for the subset of legal
services that consists of judicial decision-making. But we should not expect,
save possibly from the tiny and shrinking minority of old-fashioned appellate
judges who continue to write their own opinions, the literary or rhetorical
gems that we associate with such names as Holmes, Hand, Cardozo, and
Jackson, or the powerful essays in social and political theory of a John
Marshall or a Brandeis; and the tiny minority's ability to come up to the
standard of these illustrious predecessors is imperiled by the demands for
quantity of output that are placed on the modem judge. There is craft in
supervision; perhaps in the fullness of time the profession will recognize a
new sort of master judge, one who elicits outstanding product from a staff as
distinct from producing his own carefully wrought opinions. But it is different
from the (figuratively speaking) artisanal craft of the famous judges of yore.
Although the average quality of judicial opinions has probably not
diminished as a result of the delegation of the opinion-writing function to law
clerks, the variance in quality surely has, as is implied in my remarks about
1993]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the decline of the great judge. Law clerks, drawn as they are from the best
students, are intellectually more homogeneous than the judges. The tendency
to uniformity of output, which I believe is also characteristic of legal briefs,
has its counterpart in the evolution toward mass production of industrial
products. Despite the emphasis laid by the medieval craft guilds on the
importance of uniformity, handicrafts are less likely to be of uniform quality
than machine-made products, because machine production facilitates
standardization and testing. Law clerks are not machines, but the division of
labor in the judiciary as elsewhere facilitates a comparable type of standard-
ization. It buffers the differences between individual judges. The Bachrach
studio is not Rembrandt or even Brady (and Brennan is not Brandeis), but
modem photography provides a better, or at least more uniform, average
quality of portraiture than the artisanal methods that preceded it.
As part of the research for Cardozo: A Study in Reputation (1990), I read
the briefs that had been submitted to Cardozo's court (the New York Court
of Appeals) in the twenty cases, decided mainly in the 1920's, that I planned
to discuss in the book. Although Cardozo's opinions owed little to the briefs,
I was struck by the individuality of the briefs, their thoroughness, their
meticulous grammatical and typographical accuracy, and the obvious care with
which they had been planned and drafted. The authors were not legal geniuses
(with the possible exception of Robert Jackson, who wrote one of the briefs),
but they were true craftsmen. I was struck by the contrast with the mass-
produced uniformity, the characterlessness, the impersonality, and the evident
hastiness of the vast majority of the "good" briefs submitted in Seventh
Circuit cases in the 1980's. It was in fact my reflection on this contrast that
led to this paper.
Do not suppose, however, that the growing uniformity of legal output spells
a growing uniformity of lawyers' earnings. A competitive legal profession
offers an opportunity for entrepreneurial returns that a cartelized one does not,
in the same way that the advent of mass production offers profit opportunities
that dwarfed the monopoly returns of guild producers. Indeed, one thing that
makes cartels, including professional cartels, fragile is that some producers
can make more money as members of a competitive industry. Thus at a time
when legal restrictions made it essentially impossible to create a nationwide
law firm, lawyers whose talents ran to the organization of large enterprises
and the penetration of new markets were unable to cash in on their talents.
VIII. THE TWILIGHT OF JURISPRUDENCE
In discussing Brown v. Board of Education, I offered a glimpse of the world
of legal thought as it stood on the eve of law's industrial revolution, described
above. It is the world of thought epitomized by Professor Wechsler's article
on neutral principles, criticizing Brown. The analytical shortcomings of the
article, one of the most heavily cited in legal history, have been documented
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by others" and need not detain us here. It is its representative character that
interests me. What it represents is the juristic counterpart of artisanality.
The form is that of a personal statement. "Let me begin by stating that I
have not the slightest doubt respecting the legitimacy of judicial review [of
the constitutionality of federal or state legislative or executive actions]."'"
This would be a curious beginning for a scientific or social-scientific article,
because it assumes that the author's inner mental state, his doubts or
confidences, have a significance independent of the reasoning or evidence that
he offers in support of his views. When craft is a mystery, the identity of the
craftsman conveys valuable information. The article identifies Wechsler as the
holder of a named professorship in constitutional law at a major law school,
Columbia, and explains that the article is the text of the Oliver Wendell
Holmes Lecture, given annually at the Harvard Law School, then the world's
preeminent law school. The lecture series was named after the Anglo-
American world's most illustrious jurist, himself the most famous graduate of,
(briefly) a professor at, and long identified with that law school. Wechsler
notes in his first paragraph that the previous year's Holmes lecturer had been
Learned Hand, the greatest judge in the history of the federal courts of
appeals. Wechsler's article begins on page one of the seventy-third volume of
the Harvard Law Review, at the time the nation's foremost legal journal. The
article is thus more (or less) than an effort at scholarly analysis; it is the self-
conscious performance of a master craftsman of the guild of lawyers.
We should not be surprised that Wechsler's tone is patronizing. The
conception of the Supreme Court "as an ever-open forum for the ventilation
of all grievances that draw upon the Constitution for support," a plausible
conception one might have thought as an original matter, is derided as the
view of "the uninstructed," who ignore the need for "rigorous insistence on
the satisfaction of procedural and jurisdictional requirements-[an insistence]
fundamental in the thought and work of Mr. Justice Brandeis" 52 -so nothing
more need be said in justification of it. The cynic might have wondered
whether Brandeis's insistence on these technicalities may not have been
intended to inhibit the Court from reaching substantive questions that a
majority of the Justices were likely to answer in a way unpleasing to
Brandeis, a man of emphatic substantive views. But the idea that Brandeis
might not have been a perfectly disinterested professional, might in fact have
been influenced by political and strategic considerations, is not allowed to
intrude; it would be like imputing the profit motive to a respected member of
a medieval craft guild.
It soon becomes clear that one of the most important duties of judges,
according to Wechsler, is to resist the pull of common sense and laymen's
justice. Even a lay person understands, or should understand, that judges have
not been given a blank check on which to write their personal and political
50. See, e.g., Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1988).
51. Wechsler, supra note 38, at 2.
52. Id. at 6.
1993]
1NDIANA LAW JOURNAL
preferences and call them the Constitution. But Wechsler wants to identify
cases in which lay intuition fails because they involve palpable, or at least
plausible, violations of the Constitution yet the judges refuse to do, or at least
they should refuse to do, anything about them: infringements of the guarantee
of a republican form of government; gerrymanders, and legislative malap-
portionment generally; laws forbidding marriage between persons of different
races; laws prohibiting blacks from voting in the Democratic or Republican
primaries; and laws prohibiting blacks from attending the same public schools
as whites (and vice versa). Only the last two examples are discussed at length.
The objection to rectifying these apparent denials of the equal protection of
the laws is that Wechsler cannot find an adequately general principle to cover
them. A principle is adequately general, he believes, only if it treats
consistently not only the case at hand but any hypothetical or actual case
within the principle's semantic scope. We can see in this proposal the
technique of the law school classroom-where students' attempts to formulate
legal principles are challenged by the teacher's putting hypothetical cases that
test the scope of the principle-being elevated to a methodological require-
ment of constitutional adjudication. 3
The approach is hardly inevitable. One might have supposed that the central
question in Brown v. Board of Education was whether racial segregation of
public facilities in the South was intended to keep the blacks in their
traditionally subordinate position and likely to contribute to that goal. This
was a factual question, the answer to which was obvious, although it might
have been impolitic for the Supreme Court to utter it; this may be why the
Court focused not on the motives or political consequences of public school
segregation but instead on the consequences for the educational attainments
and psychological well-being of blacks. Wechsler is not interested in the
motives for, or the effects of, segregation. He wants to restate the constitu-
tional question as whether there is a principle of freedom of association that
would permit blacks to complain about being kept out of white schools but
forbid whites to complain about having to go to school with blacks.
That is a way of looking at the case. But the only reason that I can think
of for why Wechsler thought it was the way is that it is more congenial than
factual inquiry to the type of rhetoric characteristic of lawyers, with their
fondness for abstract concepts ("freedom of association"), arguments from
logic, and hypothetical cases.5 4 Professionals do not want to risk undermin-
ing their claim to professional autonomy by getting into areas where they do
not command all the tools of inquiry. They want to do well what they do well,
53. Wechsler himself has said, "I found myself developing the neutral principles idea as a
pedagogical instrument for pushing students into subjecting their own immediate reactions of approval
or disapproval of the results of a particular decision, to a more searching type of criterion of evaluation."
Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles' in the Law: Selections from the Oral
History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 CoLUM. L. REV. 854, 925 (1993).
54. The case method "puts a premium on verbal manipulation and encourages a tendency to look
inward at the consistency of the system rather than outward at the relation of the system to the real
world, and at its impact on people and events." Erwin N. Griswold, Intellect and Spirit, 81 HARV. L.
Rav. 292, 299 (1967).
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even if they could mike a greater social contribution by performing a more
important task, such as rendering social justice, less well. Implicitly, they
place the welfare of the profession above the welfare of the community. The
analogy is to the medieval physicians who emphasized prognosis so that they
could decline patients likely to die and concentrate on those who were likely
to recover with or without medical attention.
I call what lawyers do well (I mean lawyers in their forensic or argumenta-
tive capacities-not as counselors, advisors, negotiators, or draftsmen of
contracts or other instruments) rhetoric rather than reasoning because so much
forensic legal writing, even of the most celebrated sort, has only the form and
not the substance of intellectual rigor. Wechsler's article does not explain, or
adequately define, or indicate the provenance of, orjustify, his central concept
of "neutral principles." I think all he means is that decisions should be
"principled," and that all that means is that judges should avoid grounds of
decision which would require them to engage with the messy world of
empirical reality-to inquire, for example, into the motives and consequences
of public school segregation. On this interpretation of what Wechsler is
saying, a comparable decision by a legislature might be principled. That is,
the term may be relative to the capabilities, traditions, and so on of the
institution making the decision in question, although as Peller points out,
Wechsler never allows the court to inquire into the actual competence of the
legislature-it assigns spheres of competence in an empirical void.5 Maybe
Wechsler thinks that the decision in Brown was redistributive in charac-
ter-shifting wealth from whites to blacks-and that redistributive judgments,
however just, are for legislatures to make rather than courts.
Wechsler never gets around to sorting out any of these matters or engaging
in any other close analysis because his preferred method of argument is the
posing of rhetorical questions, of which I count sixty in his thirty-five page
article. The rhetorical question is the literary counterpart to the coerced
confession: it forces the reader's agreement. The cascades of rhetorical
questions in the neutral-principles article force upon the reader a predeter-
mined choice: agree with Wechsler, or join the idiots who "perceive in law
only the element of fiat," or, even worse (in an image that has come to seem
almost obscene), who believe "that the courts are free to function as a naked
power organ."
' 6
Rhetorical questions are not the only rhetorical technique Wechsler used
heavily. The article does not fail to mention the famous cases that he had
argued in the Supreme Court, and it harps on the deep liberal sympathies that
make it painful for the author to expose the inadequacies of the Supreme
Court's racial jurisprudence 5 7-but his sense of craft permits no less. The
article, assisted by its occasion and its setting, richly illustrates the "ethical
55. Peller, supra note 50, at 611-13.
56. Wechsler, supra note 38, at 12.
57. As Weehsler has said, "Indeed, one of the elements of rhetorical effectiveness in the piece was
precisely that I persuaded people that I liked the results [of the race cases] and still felt it important to
question the grounds.' Silber & Miller, supra note 53, at 926 (citation omitted).
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appeal" of classical rhetoric, in which the speaker enhances the persuasive
power of his argument by persuading the audience that he is the kind of
person who ought to be believed whatever he says. And there is a teasing
coyness, the lawyer's traditional evasion of straight talking. For Wechsler
never does say that the decision in Brown was actually wrong, but only that
no one has yet come up with a persuasive rationale-not even he.
The rhetorical character of Wechsler's article, reinforcing the rhetorical
character of the mode of reasoning commended by it, points up the artifactual
quality of traditional legal writing and reasoning, and in doing so can help us
understand the artisanal character of the traditional, competitively restricted
legal profession. Like an artist or an artisan, the traditional legal advocate,
professor, or judge produced neither a replicatable or otherwise verifiable
argument or proof, nor a standardized product could be readily evaluated in
the marketplace for legal services or academic scholarship. He produced an
essentially literary product in which to display mastery of the rhetorical skills
that are the distinctive fruit of lawyers' talent, training, and experience.
Holmes was never farther off the mark than when he called law the calling of
thinkers, not poets. 8 Not all by any means, but much of his celebrity, like
that of the other great figures in the history of the Anglo-American legal
profession up to and including Herbert Wechsler, is due to the power of his
rhetoric. 9
I have been picking on Wechsler not (I hope) out of malice or envy but
because, like Henry Hart, he is a leading figure of the "legal process" school,
Harvard's answer to legal realism, a synthesis of Langdell and Holmes.
Wechsler is not a strict constructionist, and I daresay would not like to be
called a formalist. Yet if the neutral-principles article is representative, as I
think it is, of the legal-process school, rather little of substance separates the
Harts and the Wechslers from the Langdells and the Beales. The vocabulary
is different, more modem; the touchstones are reasonableness and institutional
competence rather than authoritative legal texts and fundamental jural
concepts; but at bottom there is the same unspoken conviction that the
relations among legal concepts are rightly the focus of legal analysis, and the
same unacknowledged dependence on homogeneity of outlook and of values
as the real motor of consensus, and the same confident feeling of being in
possession of cogent tools of inquiry, and the same sense of the judge or the
Supreme Court Justice as a kind of failed law professor.
It is not easy to imagine an article like Wechsler's being written today. The
Harvard Law School, wracked by internal political struggles unthinkable in
58. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Profession of Law, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM
THE LETrERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WR1TINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR. 218 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
59. I argue this point in RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOzO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 133-34 (1990),
and in RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LrrERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 281-89 (1988). The
role of bluff and posturing in the success of the professions is not limited to law-how else to explain
the prestige and profitability of medicine in the many centuries before scientific advances finally made
the net expected benefits of medical treatment positive? Cf. FREIDSON, supra note 6, at 16.
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the 1950's, has lost its unchallenged preeminence; the Harvard Law Review,
with its epicycles of affirmative action, is on its way to becoming a laughing
stock; the Holmes Lectures have lost much of their luster; and there is no
longer anyone in the legal profession who has the kind of stature that a
Wechsler achieved, with his service at Nuremberg, his Supreme Court
advocacy, his coauthorship of the most famous casebook in legal history (the
Hart and Wechsler federal courts book), his authorship of the Model Penal
Code, and his directorship of the American Law Institute when that institution
had an eminence it no longer has. Of course, giants are not always visible to
contemporaries; the necessary perspective is lacking. But as the legal
profession becomes larger, more specialized, more diverse, more commercial,
one has increasing difficulty imagining a career, a confidence, a consciousness
of authority, of self-sufficiency, like Wechsler's, that would enable a member
of the profession to mount the rhetorical high horse from which Wechsler
declaimed the neutral-principles paper.
I have said that a competitive industry does not have an ideology.6 So I
expect that as law becomes more and more competitive, jurisprudence, in its
sense as ideology (not critique) of law, will become increasingly irrelevant to
those not engaged in the production of jurisprudence. The mission of
jurisprudence was to show that law was more than politics and rhetoric.
Writing at a time when most intelligent lawyers no longer believed (or found
it expedient to believe or claim) that the text of the Constitution provided an
algorithm for deciding all cases, Wechsler proposed "neutral principles" as an
alternative to strict construction as a guarantor of law's objectivity, its
impersonality, its freedom from politics and public opinion. The homogeneity
of the elite professional community that Wechsler addressed assured an
audience predisposed to agree with one of its intellectual leaders. Not only the
messenger, but the message, was welcome. So it was not at first scrutinized
critically, even though, as Peller and others have shown, its analytical faults
are both very great and very near the surface of the piece, and, as I have
argued, it subordinates analysis to rhetoric. What oft was thought (the
conventional, guild-edged wisdom of the professional elite) but ne'er so well
expressed.
All the criticisms of Wechsler's article, however, may seem wide of its
basic point, which surely no one will disagree with, that judicial decisions
should be principled. Yet this insistence itself bespeaks guild thinking. As the
hearings on the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court
showed, the people want two things from judges: they want particular results
(such as capital punishment and the decriminalization of abortion), and they
want judges who find rather than make law. These things are incompatible.
Judges nevertheless find it fairly easy to satisfy the public's demands by
giving them the results they want, clothed in the rhetoric of passive obeisance
to "the law" (including law the judges may have made up last week). This
60. 1 acknowledge an exception for industries that produce a product that many people want to ban,
like cigarettes or napalm.
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lends a hypocritical tone and illogical content to many judicial opinions,
offending guild norms, or, what is closely related, professional norms, of lofty
personal morality and scrupulous craftsmanship. It is steadfast adherence to
those norms, not, as Wechsler predicted in the neutral-principles piece, the
failure to adhere to them steadfastly, that endangers popular support for
judicial independence.
As the legal profession opens up to diverse viewpoints and backgrounds; as
paralegals become authorized (as I hope and believe they someday will be)
to form their own law firms and compete with "real" lawyers; as bankers,
accountants, statisticians, economists, computer engineers, and management
consultants play an increasing role in the formulation and application of law;
as law firms grow, diversify, and become increasingly international; as legal
education becomes more optional, hence more practical, and its frills
discarded; as judiciaries become larger and more specialized; as law, like the
rest of social life, becomes more and more quantitative and computerized, I
think the traditional preoccupations that go by the name of jurisprudence will
seem and be increasingly irrelevant. The sort of people who believe that the
important thing is to police the boundaries between law and other forms of
discourse and of policy intervention-who think it rewarding to ask whether
the "law" applied at the Nuremberg trials of the Nazi war criminals was
"really" law-who think it illuminating to list the "ten major criteria [that]
may be relevant to evaluating the appropriateness of a given type of
substantive reason for use in the law"-to wit, "(1) intrinsic justificatory
force, (2) conventional justificatory force, (3) commensurability with other
reasons, (4) intelligibility and persuasiveness, (5) transmutability into stable
rules, (6) 'guidesomeness,' (7) efficient constructability, (8) possible
arbitrariness of 'boundary conditions,' (9) general 'range' of the reason, and
(10) suitability for court use" 6 -will come to seem as irrelevant to the
theory and practice of law as the writings of the lesser medieval canonists,
whom they resemble. Their hermetic discourse befits a profession that seeks
to justify its privileges by pointing to the high obscurity of its thought. I think
too that academic lawyers will abandon the hope expressed by Professor
Rakowski, that jurisprudence can produce roadmaps for judges. 2 Like most
philosophy, all that jurisprudence can do is to arm one against philosophical
arguments. It is therapeutic, but not curative.
Once lawyers could be said to serve "the law." Now they serve the client.
It is a profound difference. The word "law" has, it is true, a number of uses.
One is to denote an ingenious machinery for social control that is based on
widely shared social values such as liberty and efficiency and that is operated
in accordance with norms of disinterestedness and predictability. That such a
machinery is a public good of great value would be obvious even without the
example of the former communist states, whose people understand better than
61. Robert S. Summers, Jurisprudence andPolitical Theory: Judge Richard Posner"s Jurisprudence,
89 MICH. L. REv. 1302, 1333 (1991).
62. Eric Rakowski, Posner's Pragmatism, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1681 (1991).
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we-or at least more consciously than we-that the creation of such a
machinery is a prerequisite to freedom and prosperity. Indeed, this has been
understood since Aristotle's day. But "law" is not just a system of social
control; the word is also used to denote a ghostly entity that somehow
subtends, organizes, validates, and criticizes the system. That entity-which
is not a real entity, but a fantasy-is, I have been arguing, the intellectual by-
product of the cartelization of the legal profession. It is a thing, or nonthing,
not to be venerated, or even to be mastered, but to be unmasked, to be
overcome, and to be replaced by-but that is a story for another day.

